ISSUES AND TRENDS IN THE U.S. FIELD CROP SECTOR by Johnson, D. Demcey




The  U.S.  and Canadian  crop  sectors  share  several  common  trends.
Changes  in international  trade  patterns,  the  growing  importance  of privately
funded  agricultural research,  and continuing  pressures  toward larger  farm size
are likely  to affect both countries in similar ways.  In  what follows, I will ex-
pand on  a few areas  that Kurt Klein has already  touched  upon  - -specifically,
the  differentiation  of commodities  by end-use characteristics  and  biotechnol-
ogy - -and  introduce another topic,  e-commerce,  that may have  important im-
plications  for competitive  conditions  in the  crop  sector.  I will  also  discuss
three other  areas of  special interest  in grains and  oilseeds:  consolidation  and
integration of handlers and processors;  progress toward harmonization of regu-
latory regimes;  and the recent evolution of U.S. agricultural policy.
DIFFERENTIATION  BY END-USE  CHARACTERISTICS
The  marketplace  for  grains  and  oilseeds  has  seen  a  proliferation  of
'value-added'  varieties.  Advances  in plant breeding  have  made it feasible  to
design commodities with specific end-use characteristics.  Some specialty crops,
such as waxy  corn, predate  the biotech  revolution by many  years,  and others,
such  as  high-oil  corn  and  food-grade  soybeans,  are  more  recent products  ofJohnson  273
commercial breeding programs.  Genetic engineering can only further this trend
by facilitating the incorporation  of traits desired by processors,  livestock feed-
ers,  and food manufacturers  (Riley and Hoffman,  1999).
For producers,  price premiums  offer  the main  incentive  for  growing
value-enhanced  crops.  Premiums must be sufficient  to compensate  producers
for any yield differentials  relative to standard  varieties, and for any extra costs
(including segregation) associated with production or on-farm storage. Because
value-enhanced  crops are identified  with  niche  markets, premiums  are  highly
dependent on supply conditions and, in some cases, can only be secured through
contractual  arrangements  with buyers.  These market factors point to a host of
issues relating  to  'vertical  coordination'  in the  market channel  for grains  and
oilseeds,  for example  the increased reliance of food manufacturers  and proces-
sors on contracting,  rather than  spot-market  transactions,  for procurement  of
crops with  specific  end-use  characteristics.  As  in  the livestock  and poultry
sectors,  an increase  in contracting  will  tend  to  diminish the  significance  of
traditional  cash  markets  while  accentuating  the  informational  asymmetries
among producers.  Contracting may entail standardization  of production meth-
ods (e.g., chemical  applications)  to ensure that the crop meets  buyers'  quality
requirements.  Some loss of control,  either in production methods  or market-
ing,  seems  inescapable  for  producers  who contract  for value-enhanced  com-
modities.  It should be noted that,  for some crops and production  regions,  the
potential for contracting  could be limited by uncertainty  over growing condi-
tions and crop quality.  For example, domestic millers  and some export buyers
of hard spring wheat have preferences  for particular varieties  due to their mill-
ing or baking characteristics,  yet contracting  with growers  by wheat variety  is
quite uncommon',  likely because of the large, intrinsic quality variation in spring
wheat due to year-to-year changes  in growing conditions. 2
The differentiation of crops holds important implications for grain han-
dling  and transportation.  Much of the U.S. grain handling infrastructure  has
'In  fact, General  Mills is  one of the few firms with procurement for particular wheat
varieties,  and these account for only  15 percent of the firm's total purchases.
William Wilson (personal  communication)  also suggests that premiums  for specific
varieties  have  not emerged  because  of difficulties  in distinguishing  wheat  varieties in
the U.S.  system.
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been designed  to  take  advantage  of low-cost,  high-volume  shipments  and op-
portunities for bulk storage.  This reflects deregulated  rail rates and the advent
of unit trains (both in the  1980s), in addition to Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC) loan programs and the Farmer Owned Reserve (FOR) under earlier farm
bills,  which created  substantial  need for  commercial  grain  storage.  Efficient
handling  and transportation  of  'generic'  commodities  are likely to remain  an
important  feature  of the  U.S.  system.  However,  the  growing  importance  of
specialty  crops  and niche  markets  is creating  new demands:  for  more careful
segregation  and identity-preserved  (IP) shipments  and other forms of coordi-
nated  'supply  chain  management.'  Vertical  linkages between  processors  and
grain  handlers,  through direct  acquisitions,  strategic  alliances,  preferred-sup-
plier relationships  or other methods,  is  often an  outgrowth  of commercial  de-
mand for grains  or oilseeds  with  specific quality  attributes.
Crop differentiation  also presents  a challenge to the public  sector;  for
example, with respect to the price-reporting  and commodity-analysis  functions
of USDA.  Prices quoted for standard  grades (e.g., No.  2 yellow corn) at tradi-
tional market centers, collected and published  by the USDA Agricultural  Mar-
keting  Service  (AMS),  give  little  guidance  to  producers  or traders of  value-
enhanced crops.  Similarly,  data provided  by the  National Agricultural  Statis-
tics Service  (NASS)  for crop acreage,  and Economic Research  Service (ERS)
Situation and Outlook reports,  do not provide the level of detail necessary  for
analysis of supply-demand  conditions for these crops  within the broader com-
modity  aggregates.3 The  absence of public  price  information  for value-en-
hanced crops  not  only obscures  the efficiency  of the  price discovery  process,
but also creates problems  for crop and revenue  insurance.
BIOTECHNOLOGY  AND  GENETICALLY  MODIFIED  CROPS
For a large segment of the public, the term 'biotechnology'  is now firmly
linked with genetic engineering, despite the more expansive interpretation given
However, NASS  does report  acreage  planted to genetically-modified  crops as an ag-
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it by many researchers. 4 Food products  derived through genetic  modification
(GM)  have found a level of acceptance  in the North American market  but are
strongly  resisted  elsewhere,  notably  in Europe.  Consumer resistance  to  GM
crops and official trade barriers in foreign markets could have profound conse-
quences for the U.S. crop sector in years to come.
Most of the commercially  successful applications of genetic engineer-
ing  to U.S.  crops  have targeted  agronomic  characteristics,  e.g.,  insect resis-
tance in corn  and cotton, or herbicide  tolerance in soybeans.  Tremendous po-
tential  also  exists for enhancing  the  end-use characteristics  of grains and oil-
seeds through genetic engineering techniques.  However, much will depend  on
consumer  acceptance  and  the resolution  of outstanding  regulatory  issues  in
U.S. and foreign markets.  Differences in proposed labeling standards (manda-
tory  versus  voluntary,  'positive'  versus  'negative'  labels)  and tolerances  are
now  the subject  of intense  scrutiny.  Growers  of GM crops  without enhanced
consumption  characteristics  have  no  incentive  to voluntarily  label  their pro-
duction  as  'containing  GM'.  On the other hand, voluntary  labeling of  'GM-
free'  crops  might be  economically  justified  by  price  premiums  or access  to
otherwise  restricted markets.  (See Golan,  2000 for discussion.)  Internation-
ally,  the United States  and Canada appear  to be  increasingly isolated  in their
opposition to mandatory  labeling of GM crops.5 Given the importance  of off-
shore markets  to both countries,  it seems  likely that foreign labeling require-
ments and standards  will dictate more careful segregation  of GM and non-GM
crops within the North American grain handling  system, whether or not label-
ing becomes mandatory.
4 Riley and Hoffman (p. 23) define biotechnology as "the use of biological organisms or
processes in any technological  application.  Genetic engineering can be thought of as a
subset of biotechnology  1/4"  According  to Caswell,  Fuglie and Klotz  (p.  2),  the term
"refers to all parts of an industry that creates develops, and markets  a variety of products
using  monoclonal  antibodies,  cell  culture,  biosensors,  and  genetic  engineering  tech-
niques."  More recently, agricultural biotechnology  has referred to the use of recombi-
nant DNA technology  (DNA formed  by combining  segments of DNA from  different
organisms) to alter or move genetic material in plants (such as corn or soybeans)  so that
a desired trait is expressed.
5 Labeling requirements  for genetically-modified  food are now  in force in the EU, and
soon  will be implemented  in Japan, South Korea,  Australia, and New Zealand.
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Additional  costs  of segregation  and IP  shipments  must be  ultimately
borne by buyers or by producers  and handlers,  depending on the demand  char-
acteristics  and  shares  of particular  markets.  The  size and  incidence  of cost
burdens  associated  with  segregation  are  now  attracting  research  interest.  A
recent  study  suggests  that segregation  of non-GM  varieties  could  add  about
22cents/bu  to total  marketing  costs for corn  (from country  elevator to export
terminal),  and about  18 cents/bu  or 54cents/bu  for non-GM  soybeans,  depend-
ing on the segregation process used (Lin, Chambers,  and Harwood, 2000).  The
economics  of IP shipments are also  important and likely to change  in the near
future,  with larger container  vessels reducing the cost of unitized  shipments to
overseas markets (Prentice, 2000).  In combination with modern computer tech-
nology,  intermodal  containers  offer  the  opportunity  for  direct  shipments  be-
tween  producers  and  buyers  in domestic  or international  markets,  and trace-
ability.  The question  is whether  premiums  for  'GM-free'  crops will be  suffi-
cient  to justify such shipments  on a large  scale.
E-COMMERCE
The  revolution  in  information  technology  associated  with  computers
and the  internet has affected  the U.S. crop  sector in  several ways, not least by
providing  ready  access  to a  wealth  of new  market  information.  Farmers  are
increasingly using the internet to check prices of commodities and farm inputs.
Although  statistical  evidence  is  limited,  at  least  one study  also suggests  that
'farmers  are  quick  to make  the  switch  to e-transactions,  specifically  with  re-
gard to purchasing  seed, crop chemicals,  and machinery'  (Mueller, 2000;  p. 3).
This technology  seems certain  to intensify  the  competitive  pressures  on  farm
input  suppliers.  (An  example  of an  electronic  market  for  farm  inputs  is
xsag.com).  Whether e-commerce,  i.e., transactions conducted over the internet,
will play a major part in the future of crops marketing is a bit more difficult  to
anticipate,  as there are several  directions possible.
One of the more visible models of e-commerce is that of the electronic
exchange,  where buyers  and sellers  meet to transact  business.  Access  to  the
exchange  may require  a  membership  fee  or subscription,  but  firms can  then
post bids  or  offers  in  a neutral  environment  that is  fully transparent  to  other
users.  (An example  is AgEx.com,  which  operates  electronic  markets  in  rice,John  ￿on  277
almonds,  walnuts  and  pulses.)  To  their users,  the chief advantages  of elec-
tronic  exchanges  may be lower search  costs and the ability  to quickly review
bids  or offers  of potential trading  partners.  Whether through  organized  auc-
tions or simple posting of bids and offers, electronic exchanges can only widen
the scope of markets  (facilitating transactions  with new players) and intensify
price  competition.
On-line business-to-business  (B2B)  marketing  of grains  and oilseeds
has received  backing  from major  industry players.  An  example  is  Pradium
Inc., which promises to launch virtual trading pits for cash grains, oilseeds and
products early this year.  Major investors  include Cargill and ADM;  other in-
vestors include Cenex Harvest States,  Louis Dreyfus Corp.  and DuPont (Mill-
ing and Baking News, Oct. 31, 2000).  This follows by some months the launch
of Rooster.com, an e-commerce site that links farms, elevators and suppliers of
farm inputs, backed by many of the same investors. (Agweek,  October 23, 2000).
On first consideration,  the promotion of e-commerce by major commodity trad-
ing firms is somewhat surprising because, by making market prices more trans-
parent,  electronic  exchanges  would  seem  to erode  the informational  advan-
tages  enjoyed by firms like Cargill and ADM.  However, there may be consid-
erable cost savings associated with shifting away from a telephone-based trad-
ing  system  to one based  on  computers  and  the internet.  And  the  firms  now
taking the lead in e-commerce for grains and oilseeds are integrated and diver-
sified processors,  for whom  commodity trading is becoming more ancillary.
The electronic  exchange  is not the only model of e-commerce  relevant
to grains  and oilseeds.  Producers,  elevators  and  processors  are  likely to  de-
velop  a  greater  reliance  on  electronic  sharing  of information-  -e.g.,  procure-
ment  plans,  detailed  information  on  grain  inventories,  measures  of end-use
performance  for  specific  shipments,  etc.  Those  activities  would  be  an  out-
growth of greater vertical coordination of supply chains,  as processors and food
manufacturers  seek greater control over quality and logistics.  Intranet technol-
ogy will allow partners in a supply chain to share as much (or as little) informa-
tion as they like.  This kind of selective information  sharing takes e-commerce
in a different  direction than that represented by electronic  exchanges:  toward
longer-term alliances and contractual arrangements between firms and less trans-
parency in pricing.
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Table  1:  Measures  of Market Power  at Different  Points in the U.S.
Marketing  System,  1995.




Gulf and  PNW  56  1334  Cargill, ADM,  Harvest States,  Bunge
U.S.  Gulf  53  897  Cargill,  ADM,  Continental  (HSPV&
Corpus  Christi tied)
PNW  69  2089  Cargill,  TEMPCO  (Harvest States),
Peavey,  United  Grain
Processing
Flour  Milling  70  1420  Cargill,  ADM,  ConAgra,  CFP
Malting*  60  1178  ConAgra,  Cargill,  Anheuser Busch,  ADM
Brewing  87  2818  Anheuser Busch,  Miller,  Coors,  Stroh
Minor  78  2085  ADM,  CanAmerica,Cargill,  Cargill  Ltd.
Oilseeds*
* Shares in  North America.
Source:  Wilson and  Dahl,  1999.
CONSOLIDATION  IN  GRAIN  HANDLING AND  PROCESSING
Concentration  in the grain handling and processing  sectors is a topic of
perennial  interest to U.S.  farmers.  Interest  has been  heightened recently  by
Cargill's  acquisition  of Continental's  grain division, 6 but  concerns about  in-
dustry concentration  and the major firms' market power in grains and oilseeds
has  a much longer history (Lauck, 2000).  One of the interesting  facets of this
topic  is that, while similar concerns were expressed over a quarter century ago
(in the  wake of the  'Great Grain  Robbery'),  the  list of major firms has  since
changed  drastically.  Cooperatives  now play a larger role than they did in the
1970s, and several of the private firms that dominated grain exports in the  1970s
have  exited.  The  1990s  saw  a proliferation of mergers,  acquisitions  and joint
ventures,  most designed  to combine  country  origination  with export terminal
6 See Hayenga  and Wisner  (year) for  a summary  of economic  issues  surrounding this
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or processing  capacity.  Joint ventures  between various cooperatives  (Harvest
States,  Farmland, AGRI  Industries,  Growmark)  and privately-held  companies
(Cargill,  Continental)  or publicly-traded  corporations  (ADM,  ConAgra)  now
make  for a  fairly  complex  picture  of firm  rivalry in  individual  market chan-
nels. 7
Table  1 (from Wilson and Dahl,  1999, p.  26), shows two measures  of
concentration  for different segments of U.S. grain handling and processing in-
dustries:  the 4-firm capacity  share  and Herfindahl  index.8 In general,  export
grain handling  is  somewhat less  concentrated  than the processing  industries.
The Herfindahl  index for export handling at PNW ports (measured as load-out
capacity)  suggests  a greater  potential for exercise of market  power than at the
U.S.  Gulf.  However, handling  margins at export elevators  are also limited by
competition between port areas, so concentration  measures at the PNW may be
somewhat misleading.  These results point to an analytical problem,  i.e.,  how
to define the market boundaries  for investigations of industry concentration  or
market power.  The  issue of market boundaries  applies equally  to processing
industries,  such as  flour milling or malting, where companies  have  integrated
both horizontally  and vertically.  With the elimination  of barriers  to trade  in
North America,  the frame of reference  for competition  (antitrust)  policy  will
increasingly include Canada and Mexico.
Although  public concerns  about industry  concentration  tend  to focus
on market power, consolidation in grain handling and processing  has also been
driven by efficiency  gains.  In an empirical analysis of the hard wheat milling
industry,  Steigert and Carton (1998)  found an inverse relationship between in-
dustry  concentration  and average  marketing  margins.  They found  little  evi-
dence  that the industry  exercised  market  power  in  either upstream  or down-
stream markets,  despite  a 4-firm capacity ratio reaching  77 percent  at the end
of their  study period.
7 For a review  of ownership  changes  and joint ventures in grain handling,  see Wilson
and Dahl  (1999).  Between  1991  and  1998,  they count 24 new joint ventures  in the
grain trade, and 91  mergers or acquisitions.
8 Defined  as H = _ S2 where S. is the share (%)  of firm i in a given industry or market
segment.  H=10,000 corresponds to a pure monopoly while H=0 corresponds to perfect
competition.
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Integration  of the North American market for grains and oilseeds pre-
sents  some interesting  questions in this context.  To what extent are horizontal
mergers  a response  to reduced  trade  barriers?  Are  other factors  at  play'?  A
recent study of the malting industry  addresses the impact of the Canadian-U.S.
Trade Agreement (CUSTA) on the economics of transborder mergers (Buschena
and Gray,  1999).  Prior to trade  liberalization,  the  U.S. and Canadian malting
sectors  were distinct  and separate;  as  a result of CUSTA,  they evolved  into a
single continental market.  The elimination of barriers to continental trade could
have been expected  to increase price competition between firms, but a wave  of
mergers and acquisitions,  beginning in the late  1980s, left a handful of compa-
nies  with  most plant  capacity  on  both  sides  of the border.  Using  a Cournot
framework,  Buschena  and  Gray illustrate  two motivations  for  mergers:  first,
the anti-competitive  effect; and second,  cost efficiencies  associated  with coor-
dination of production plans.  Interestingly, they show that mergers of U.S. and
Canadian malting firms could have produced a positive welfare effect despite a
loss of price competition,  due to savings associated  with regional shifts of pro-
duction.
There are  other aspects of horizontal integration in the  malting barley
sector.  Malt companies (or their parents) and Anheuser-Busch,  the largest brewer
(with substantial malting capacity of its own),  have broadened their geographi-
cal access  to malting-quality  barley  through  ownership  of grain  handling  fa-
cilities on both sides  of the U.S.-Canada  border.  With geographical  diversifi-
cation in procurement,  these firms are less vulnerable  to quality  risks and sup-
ply disruptions.
HARMONIZATION  OF  REGULATORY  REGIMES
Although the United States and Canada have made substantial progress
toward an integrated  market for grains  and oilseeds, further integration is lim-
ited by differences  in marketing  institutions and regulatory features.  The role
of the Canadian  Wheat  Board (CWB)  as single-desk  seller of Western  Cana-
dian  wheat  and  barley  provides  the  most  obvious  contrast  with  U.S.  market
organization,  and seems  sure to remain  a point of contention.  There  are  also
other,  subtler differences  in the grains sector,  including systems of grades  and
standards  and controls over variety release.  These do not appear to be signifi-Johnson  28]
cant barriers to north-south trade.9 Barriers to trade in the other direction have
also been reduced.  Exports of U.S. feed barley  to western Canada are a rever-
sal  of the historical  pattern,  and U.S.  exports  of corn  to Manitoba  have  pro-
voked the kind of response (Canadian allegations of unfair subsidies) that North
Dakota farmers  might well understand. 0
Apart from the role of the CWB,  there are other regulatory differences
that affect market integration in a nontrivial  way.  Canada's grain transporta-
tion system is much more highly regulated  than that in the United States. As a
result of caps on rail rates,  movements of Canadian grain from the Prairies  to
export position  are  substantially  cheaper than comparable  west-bound move-
ments  from Northern  Plains  states.  The  rate  caps  apply  only for Canadian
grains.  Their significance can be gauged by the observation that, if U.S. farm-
ers had equal access  to Canada's  rail system and regulated  rates,  the drawing
area  of that system could extend well across the border into prime wheat pro-
ducing areas of North Dakota and Montana (Wilson and Dahl, 1998).  Of course,
there is no prospect of equal access  at these favorable rates, and the survival of
rate caps will depend on Canada's own debate over rail deregulation.  The point
is that potential changes in Canada's rail system are also of interest to the United
States-  -at  least  to the extent that they  facilitate transshipment  of U.S.  grain,
thereby altering the competitive environment  for U.S. rail carriers.
U.S. grain  producers  see the need for some harmonization  of regula-
tory regimes.  As an example,  Canadian producers pay lower prices for many
farm chemicals  than  their U.S.  counterparts,  partly because of differences  in
9 In  several ways,  the Canadian  system has  adapted  to accommodate  preferences  of
U.S.  grain  buyers.  For example,  cleaning  to  'export  standard'  is  not  required  when
Canadian wheat is shipped to U.S. destinations; this differs from Canada's  treatment of
offshore  shipments.  In  the barley  sector,  the normal  (multi-year) variety  registration
process  has  been expedited  in recent years  to meet U.S.  demand for specific  malting
varieties.  This  was  something  of a  challenge  for  the  grading  and handling  system,
because these varieties lack the visually distinguishable features Canada has tradition-
ally used to prevent commingling  (Johnson,  1999).
10 Given  past concerns  of U.S. producers  about wheat  and barley  imports,  there  was
some irony in the recent dispute about corn exports to Canada.  However, OECD com-
parisons of producer subsidy equivalents  (PSEs) make clear that U.S. producers of grains
and oilseeds are more heavily subsidized than their Canadian counterparts.
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patent protection.  Chemicals registered for  use on a certain  crop  may not be
registered  in another, while no restrictions apply to cross-border movements  of
the  farm  output.  Other examples  concern  phytosanitary  restrictions,  such  as
those  applied by Mexico  requiring mandatory  fumigation  and TCK  testing of
U.S.  wheat.  In  such cases,  the  United  States  has  sought bilateral  agreement
about which U.S. origins warrant special testing, fumigation or quarantine.  One
suspects that disputes  over phytosanitary  standards  would be easier to resolve
if it were clear that costs are incurred by both buyer and seller.  That depends, in
turn, on whether the buyer has access to alternative sources  of supply not sub-
ject to the  same restrictions.
EVOLUTION  OF  U.S.  FARM  POLICY
The  1996 Federal Agricultural  Improvement  and Reform Act (FAIR)
was heralded  as a major reform of U.S. agricultural programs, completing  the
trend  toward decoupling of federal payments  from planting decisions  that had
been  marked  by two  previous farm bills.  Under FAIR, producers  of program
commodities  were to receive transition payments  in decreasing amounts,  year
by  year,  in  exchange  for  (nearly)  complete  flexibility  in planting  decisions.
However,  the collapse  of commodity prices after  1997  led to financial  distress
in parts of the farm sector,  and Congress responded  with  substantial programs
of emergency  assistance,  rising from $2.8 billion in FY  1998 to $7.8 billion  in
1999,  and an estimated  $8.9  billion  in 2000.  Combined  with  large  loan defi-
ciency  payments  (LDPs),  the  result  has been  a  sharp  increase  in direct  pay-
ments to farmers,  to the extent that U.S. commitments  under the WTO for re-
duction of internal  supports could be jeopardized.  In 2000, direct government
payments  were  estimated  to account for  over 50  percent of U.S. net farm in-
come.
This experience  prompts several observations  about U.S.  farm policy.
First, commodity  prices continue  to play an important role in determining pro-
gram payments,  partly  due to the loan deficiency  payment (LDP) mechanism,
which  provides  a kind of price floor for producers  of wheat, feed  grains, soy-
beans, rice, and cotton, without constraining market prices."  In FY 2000, LDPs
'' Loan rates under the FAIR were established at a time of much higher market prices.  Few
envisioned  that loan rates would become relevant to producers within a few short years.Johnson  283
were estimated to reach $6.4 billion, up from an average of about $300 million
per year during  1993-95.  It also reflects an important political reality: that low
prices can provide impetus  for ad hoc federal assistance to farmers.  In an era
of widening  federal surpluses, there  is a chance that Congress  will enact pro-
grams of emergency  assistance  with some regularity  while  commodity prices
remain  low.
Second, as a result of LDP payments  and emergency assistance,  farm-
ers have been substantially cushioned from the effects of low commodity prices.
This effect has negated the kind of supply  response that might have been ex-
pected if producer returns  were  entirely  linked to  output markets.
1 2 Acreage
planted to program  crops has been fairly  stable in recent  years despite  lower
prices,  although  the  share of soybeans  has  grown,  and that of wheat  has  de-
clined, in response to loan-rate differentials.  Program benefits are still capital-
ized into land values and are reflected in farmland rental rates.  In fact, average
land prices have continued to rise over the past five years, even in the Northern
Plains and  Corn Belt, regions  where there have  been warnings  of acute farm
financial  stress  since  1997.  A  major  obstacle  to  future  elimination  of farm
subsidies,  at least  those tied to acreage,  is the huge  loss  of wealth this could
entail for landowners.  Of course,  that was part of the logic of transition pay-
ments under the FAIR Act.
Third, because  most farm program benefits  are tied to acreage or pro-
duction, they  accrue mainly  to large commercial farms.  This outcome  repre-
sents  a problem for  policymakers,  because  much of the motivation  for  farm
programs has been support of small and moderate-sized  'family  farms.'  There
is  a growing recognition of segmentation  within the farm sector,  although no
universal  agreement  about definitions 1 3, or about which  segments  should be
targeted for  'safety-net'  protection.  The largest share of government  payments
12 Some argue that the absence of a U.S. supply reaction has pushed more of the burden
of adjustment  to low commodity prices on foreign producers  (outside of the EU).  See
Penn, 2001  (pp. 22-30) for discussion  of the 'U.S.  supply response  anomaly.'
'3 USDA-ERS (2000)  has developed  a typology of family  farms:  five types of 'small'
family farms (sales less than $250 thousand);  'large' family farms ( sales between $250
thousand and $500 thousand);  and  'very large' family farms (sales of $500 thousand or
more).  See ERS Farm Typology for a Diverse Agricultural Sector, USDA-ERS  Agri-
culture Information  Bulletin No. 759, September  2000.
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(about 60 percent)  accrue  to farms with  sales in excess  of $100 thousand  per
year.  These  farms represent less than  15  percent of all farms, but account for
nearly 45 percent of total acres.  Family farms in the larger sales classes tend to
be more efficient as measured by operator expense ratios, and their longer-term
economic prospects  may be quite different than those of lower sales classes.
Fourth,  U.S.  farm  programs  have  historically  been  focused  on  com-
modities.  This  means that farm programs  have  supported and stabilized  farm
incomes  only indirectly.  An alternative  approach involves developing  a safety
net for farm households  based on income and earnings  criteria (Gundersen,  et
al., 2000). This would lead to a very different distribution of benefits than cur-
rent  programs.
CONCLUDING  REMARKS
Predicting  the future course of U.S. farm programs is  not easy.  Much
depends on progress  toward multilateral  reductions in farm subsidies under the
WTO and on changing international  market conditions for major crops.  Other
changes  in the U.S. field crop sector seem more certain.  The historical trend of
increasing  farm size seems  likely to continue,  driven by technological  change
and economies of scale.  The field crop sector is also likely to see further move-
ment toward  vertical  coordination  of producers,  handlers,  and  processors,
through contracting, strategic alliances,  and other means.  These trends are part
of what others have called the  'industrialization of agriculture.' 1 4 While there
is no prospect of most U.S. field crops  being absorbed into vertical  linkages to
the  same  degree  as  poultry  and swine,  the growth of demand  for specialized,
enhanced-value  crops,  and  desire  of processors  and  food  manufacturers  for
greater  control  over  quality  and  logistics,  will  make  production contracting
more common.  Contracting and the proliferation  of specialized crops will tend
to diminish the role of organized markets  (including futures exchanges)  as cen-
ters of price discovery.
14 See Saxowsky  and Duncan (1998)  for a useful discussion of the choices facing pro-
ducers  and  rural  communities.  They  argue  that  smaller-scale  farms  may  be  able  to
produce  for many niche  or specialty  markets,  but  that this likely  requires  specialized
knowledge of production systems and marketing.Johnson  285
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